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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
STATE TAXATION-UNITARY BUSINESS / FORMULA
APPORTIONMENT TAx ACCOUNTING METHOD-APPLICATION OF
A THREE FACTOR FORMULA TO APPORTION INCOME OF FOREIGN-
PARENT CORPORATIONS FOR STATE TAX REPORTING PURPOSES
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OR THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION-BARCLAYS BANK
INT'L, LTD. V. FRANCHISE TAx BD., 10 CAL. APP. 4TH 1742, 14
CAL. RPTR. 2D 537 (CAL. CT. APP. 1992), MODIFIED, REH'G
DENIED, 11 CAL. APP. 4TH 1678A (CAL. CT. APP. 1992).
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On November 20, 1992, the Court of Appeal of California, Third District,
held that the administrative burden for a foreign-parent unitary corporate
group to comply with the California worldwide combined reporting method
of income allocation for state tax reporting purposes violates neither the Due
Process Clause nor the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.'
This decision marked the final resolution of a case previously before the
California Supreme Court which had decided the case on Foreign Commerce
Clause grounds but remanded for decision of the Due Process and Interstate
Commerce Clause issues.
The case dates back to 1977 when the California Franchise Tax Board
made a determination pursuant to California's Uniform Division of Income
Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 10 Cal. App. 4th 1742, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d
537 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), modified, reh'g denied, I Cal. App. 4th 1678A (Cal. CL App.
1992) [hereinafter Barclays I]. On the same day, the Court of Appeal also decided Colgate-
Palmolive Co. v. California Franchise Tax Bd., 10 Cal. App. 4th 1768, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 761
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992), holding that California's worldwide combined reporting method does
not violate the Foreign Commerce Clause of the Constitution as applied to a domestic-parent
unitary corporate group. Although related, this case will not be discussed herein.
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for Tax Purposes Act (UDIPTA),2 that plaintiff taxpayers, Barclays Bank of
California and Barclays Bank International,3 were part of a unitary group of
2 In 1966, the California legislature passed the Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act (UDITPA). CAL. REv. & TAX CODE § 25120-38 (West, 1992). Section 25101
prescribes: "[w]hen the income of a taxpayer subject to the tax imposed under this part is
derived from or attributable to sources both within and without the state the tax shall be
measured by the net income derived from or attributable to sources within this state in
accordance with the provisions of Article 2 .... In other words, a bank or corporation that
is a branch or subsidiary of an out-of-state company, whether domestic or foreign, is taxed
upon income calculated under the provisions of this Act.
In passing the UDITPA, the California legislature statutorily authorized a variation of the
unitary business or formula apportionment method of income allocation, known as the
worldwide combined reporting method. Barclays 1, 10 Cal. App. 4th 1742, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d
537 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), modified, reh'g denied, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1678A (Cal. Ct. App.
1992). California had used this three-factor formula since first basing corporate franchise tax
accounting on income in 1929. Frank M. Keesling & John S. Warren, California's Uniform
Division of Income For Tax Purposes Act, Part I, 15 UCLA L. REv. 655, 655 (1967).
Although judicially upheld in 1941 in Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942), this
method was not statutorily authorized until 1966.
The unitary business method of tax accounting combines the activities of a unitary group
of businesses and apportions a calculated amount of those activities to the state to be taxed.
The theory behind the unitary method of income allocation is that "it is unrealistic geographi-
cally to isolate income derived from the intangible flow of value among the parts of a unitary
business." Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 3 Cal. App. 4th 1034, 1058, 275
Cal. Rptr. 626, (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) [hereinafter Barclays 11]. Historically, this method has
competed against the arm's length or separate accounting method, which treats the business
or corporation located in the state as a separate tax entity. Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Fran-
chise Tax Bd., 829 P.2d 279, 282 (Cal. 1992) [hereinafter Barclays Jll].
Twenty-four states have adopted the UDITPA: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, and Washington. CAL. REv. & TAX CODE § 25120 (West, 1992). However,
only California, Oregon, and Alaska use the worldwide combined reporting method, which
requires state income to be apportioned from a consolidated income figure of a unitary group
of businesses. James F. X. Rudy, The California Unitary Tax Concept as Applied to the
Worldwide Activities of Foreign Corporations: A Modern Commerce Clause Analysis, 15
U.S.F. L. REv. 371, 372 (1981). The worldwide combined reporting method is extremely
unpopular among most foreign nations and is not used by any other nation. Barclays II, 3
Cal. App. 4th at 1042.
3 Barclays Bank of California, a domestic corporation, and Barclays Bank International,
a foreign corporation, are both owned by the same foreign-parent corporation, Barclays Bank
Limited. Barclays Bank International has an interest in over 70 foreign subsidiaries located
in 34 countries. Barclays Bank Limited is a British-based company which does business in
over 60 countries through 140 subsidiaries. The Barclays unitary corporate entity totals over
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businesses and assessed additional taxes upon the corporations by apportion-
ing a percentage of the entity's income determined by a three-factor
formula.4 Plaintiffs paid the assessed taxes and filed written protests which
were transformed by law into a claim for a refund.' The protests challenged
the constitutionality of California's three-factor apportionment formula on
Commerce Clause and Due Process grounds.6
220 subsidiaries operating in 60 countries. Only three subsidiaries-Barclays Bank Interna-
tional, Barclays Bank of California, and Barclays Bank of New York-do business in the
United States, accounting for only two per cent of the group's total income. Id at 1059.
4 California's reporting method works as follows: an initial determination is made by the
Franchise Tax Board whether the California bank or corporation is operating within a unitary
group of related corporations whose activities are interdependent. Rudy, supra note 2, at 377,
says that "[tlhe Franchise Tax Board has construed the definition of a unitary business so
broadly that once it finds that a corporate group is characterized by a unity of ownership, the
group will be required to furnish the Franchise Tax Board with a combined report."
When such a determination is made, the corporate income tax will be calculated on the
basis of formula apportionment. Id. at 371. The California corporation is then required to
calculate the total business income of all corporations within the group. CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE §§ 25122-28 (West 1992). This task can be extremely difficult and costly since the
multinational unitary group usually keeps its records in various languages and currencies and
uses different accounting methods. Additionally, translation and transformation costs for
literal compliance often run into the millions of dollars. Barclays II, 3 Cal. App. 4th at 1059.
Next, state income is apportioned from the group's total (net) income by a three-factor
formula which apportions the group's local property, payroll, and sales from its total property,
payroll, and sales. Specifically, California property value is divided by total property value,
California payroll is divided by total payroll, and California sales are divided by total sales;
these three values are then added, divided by three, and finally multiplied by the total group
income to arrive at the state income figure. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25128 (West 1992)
(Formula For Apportioning Business Income To State), § 25129 (Formula For Determining
Property Factor), § 25132 (Formula For Determining Payroll Factor), § 25134 (Formula For
Determining Sales Factor); see also Kirsten Schlenger, State Worldwide Unitary Taxation:
The Foreign Parent Case, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 445, 445 n.2 (1985) (presenting a
graphical depiction of this income apportionment formula).
In the instant case, Barclays Bank of California was assessed an additional $152,420 and
Barclays Bank International an additional $1,678 in state taxes. Barclays II, 3 Cal. App. 4th
at 1043.
. Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., No. 325059 (Sacramento County Sup.
Ct.) and Barclays Bank of Cal. v. Franchise Tax Bd., No. 325061 (Sacramento County Sup.
Ct.).
6 Barclays 1, 10 Cal. App. 4th at 1749-50. The plaintiffs based their claim on three
causes of action: (1) the Foreign Commerce Clause and various treaties preclude the
application of the unitary business principle to the taxpayers; (2) the Commerce Clause limits'
taxation of a unitary corporate group to income earned from activities within the United
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After a bench trial, the Superior Court of Sacramento County held that, as
applied to foreign unitary groups, California's worldwide combined reporting
method was unconstitutional.! The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs that,
because the administrative burden of compliance with the California tax
method was so great, and since literal compliance with it was impossible, the
worldwide combined reporting method violated both the Due Process Clause
and the Foreign Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
On appeal, the Court of Appeal of California, Third District, affirmed,
holding that California's worldwide combined reporting method as applied
to foreign unitary groups was unconstitutional under the Foreign Commerce
Clause.9 The appeals court determined that Congress had not legislated on
the issue of state taxation of foreign subsidiaries and that, therefore, a
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause analysis was proper.10 The court
States; and (3) the Due Process Clause precludes application of the California worldwide
combined reporting method to United States activities because of distortions in the tax base
and because of the disproportionate burden of foreign-parent corporations.
7 Barclays III, 829 P.2d at 280-81.
8 The trial court upheld plaintiffs claims that (1) the administrative cost of compliance
with California's tax accounting method violated the Due Process Clause, and (2) compliance
with the taxing method lacked constitutionally adequate enforcement standards in violation
of the Due Process Clause. Barclays I, 10 Cal. App. 4th at 1756.
On the Foreign Commerce Clause issue, the trial court held plaintiff's compliance burden
was so great that it violated the nondiscrimination requirement of the dormant Interstate
Commerce Clause test, a test which is incorporated in Foreign Commerce Clause analysis.
Barclays III, 829 P.2d at 300. For a state taxing scheme to comport with the Foreign Com-
merce Clause, it must (1) not create a substantial risk of international multiple taxation; (2)
not prevent the federal government from speaking with uniformity [the two specific Foreign
Commerce Clause requirements]; (3) be applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with
the taxing state; (4) be fairly apportioned; (5) not discriminate against interstate commerce;
and (6) be fairly related to the services provided by the state. See discussion infra parts II
B-C.
9 Barclays II, 3 Cal. App. 4th at 1040.
'0 Id at 1053. A dormant Commerce Clause analysis is conducted when Congress has
not occupied the field of regulation by legislating on an issue, thereby necessitating a court
determination whether state action burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce. See
infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. The appeals court denied drawing a negative
implication of federal acquiescence to state action from the fact that proposed treaties
regulating state taxing methods were never passed in Congress, as the Supreme Court did in
Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dep't. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 12 (1986) (holding dormant
Commerce Clause analysis unnecessary since Congress had implicitly authorized states to
assess taxes on aviation fuel by refusing to legislate against it). See infra text accompanying
notes 49-50 for a full discussion of Wardair.
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further determined that the tax accounting method violated the Foreign
Commerce Clause since it impaired the federal government's ability to speak
with uniformity regarding commercial relations."1 This finding was based
on two conclusions by the court: first, the tax raised foreign policy issues
best left to the federal government and; second, that it violated a clear
federal directive. 2 Because the court found that California's unitary tax
method violated the foreign Commerce Clause, the court held it was
unnecessary to address the Due Process challenge to the legislation. 3
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed, holding that a dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause analysis was unnecessary since congressional
intent not to regulate state corporate taxing methods, especially the use of
formula apportionment, was clear. 4 Therefore, the court remanded the case
to the appeals court for a determination of the Due Process issue and the
dormant Interstate Commerce Clause issue. 5
On remand to the Court of Appeal of California, Third District, the
appeals court reversed the trial court, and held that neither the Due Process
" Barclays 1l, 3 Cal. App. 4th. The appeals court here looked to two additional inquiries
which are necessary when conducting Foreign Commerce Clause analysis: (1) whether the
tax creates a risk of multiple taxation; and (2) whether the tax may impair federal uniformity
when it is necessary that the government be able to speak with one voice. Japan Line, Ltd.
v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445-451 (1979). The appeals court held that the
second requirement was not fulfilled.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 68-70 for a discussion of these two alternative viola-
tions of the Foreign Commerce Clause requirement that the federal government speak with
uniformity in regulating international commercial relations.
13 Barclays 11, 3 Cal. App. 4th at 1068.
' The court concluded "that the relevant treaty and other materials manifest a federal
intent not to prohibit the states from employing formula apportionment in taxing the income
of such a multinational unitary business." Barclays 11l, 829 P.2d at 280. Since Congress had
affirmatively decided not to restrict the states' rights to use the tax method of their choosing
(deducing Congressional action by negative implication), dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
analysis was unnecessary. The court found the fact pattern similar to that in Wardair Canada,
477 U.S. 1 (1986), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that a dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause analysis was unnecessary since governmental silence gave rise to a " 'negative
implication' supporting an inference of federal acquiescence in the state tax under challenge."
Barclays 111, 829 P.2d at 292. See infra text accompanying notes 49-50 for a full discussion.
of Wardair.
"s Barclays IIl, 829 P.2d at 280, 300. The court remanded the case for a decision of
whether California's tax reporting method violated the nondiscrimination requirement of the
Complete Auto four-part dormant Interstate Commerce Clause test, and whether it violated
the Due Process Clause.
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Clause nor the Interstate Commerce Clause was violated. 6 Pursuant to the
nondiscrimination requirement of the Interstate Commerce Clause, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs' compliance burden was not sufficiently
oppressive to rise to the level of constitutional unconscionability.' 7
Likewise, on the compliance burden issue, the court held that the Due
Process Clause was not violated since the reporting costs were not "unrea-
sonable, undue or arbitrary,"' 8 nor was the process arbitrary or without
sufficient standards to guide the Board in enforcing the tax reporting
method.' 9 Held, the administrative burden inherent in a foreign-based
unitary group's compliance with California's worldwide combined reporting
method violates neither the Due Process Clause nor the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution. Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax
Board, 10 Cal. App. 4th 1742, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992),
modified, reh'g denied, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1678A (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Constitutional challenges to state tax accounting methods are governed by
a plethora of U.S. Supreme Court cases in which the Court has attempted to
outline the parameters of constitutionally acceptable accounting methods.
Almost all challenges are raised under the Commerce Clause and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, unless compliance with one
or the other is stipulated. As a result, the Court has created a rather complex
case law of tests and requirements necessary for constitutionally acceptable
taxing methods and successful challenges to those taxing schemes.
'6 Barclays I, 10 Cal. App. 4th at 1766.
Id. at 1756. The court held that "the burden for plaintiffs in complying with
California's unitary tax method of WWCR did not involve 'the type of differential tax
treatment that results in an unconstitutional discrimination under the Foreign Commerce
Clause test set forth in Complete Auto and Japan Line.' "
Id. The court summarily dismissed this issue, referring the reader to its analysis of the
nondiscrimination requirement of the Interstate Commerce Clause.
'9 Id. at 1757. The court stated that it "disagreed with the trial court that § 25137-6 [Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 18, § 25137-6] [the California Regulations] violates Due Process by allowing
'unfettered discretion' by the tax authorities in the wake of 'literal compliance.' We conclude
that the regulation can be construed to contain constitutionally adequate standards to guide
application."
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A. Due Process Analysis
For a state tax accounting method to comport with the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, first, there must be some "minimal connec-
tion" or nexus between the taxed entity's activities and the taxing state,
20
and, second, the amount of income taxed must have a "rational relationship"
to "values connected with the taxing state.' A minimal connection or
nexus between the corporation's activities and the taxing state can be
established by a showing that either (1) the corporation was part of a unitary
entity22 or; (2) that a portion of the total net income was derived from a
business that was part of the unitary entity. 23 Apportioned state income is
rationally related to values connected with the taxing state if the apportion-
ment is fair or if it does not generate arbitrary or "grossly distorted"
results.24 To prevail, a plaintiff must make a showing by "clear and cogent
o Moorman Mfg. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272 (1978) (rejecting a Due Process and
Commerce Clause challenge to Iowa's single-factor formula for apportioning corporate
income of an Illinois animal feed manufacturer that sold its product through salesmen and
warehouses located in Iowa), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 885 (1978) (quoting National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967)).
2" Moorman Mfg., 437 U.S. at 272-273 (quoting Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri State Tax
Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 325 (1968)). This test superseded a test previously articulated by the
U.S. Supreme Court which required that the method of allocation be fairly calculated to
assign to the state that portion of the net income reasonably attributable to business done
there. Bass, Ratcliff, & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271, 283 (1924)
(rejecting Due Process and Commerce Clause claims against a British-based ale brewery with
distribution offices in New York, challenging New York's franchise tax, calculated by a three-
factor apportionment formula).
2 See supra note 2 for an explanation of the unitary business method of tax accounting.
" Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1983) (rejecting an Illi-
nois manufacturer's Due Process challenge to California's inclusion of foreign subsidiaries'
income in the apportionment of its state income since the subsidiaries were part of the unitary
entity), reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 909 (1983); see also ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax
Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982) (holding that inclusion of income received from six
subsidiaries unrelated to the parent mining corporation in state tax accounting violated of Due
Process) reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 96(1982); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue
Dep't of N.M., 458 U.S. 354 (1982) (holding that including dividends received from
subsidiaries not operated as part of retail merchandiser's unitary enterprise in state tax
accounting would violate Due Process), rehg' denied, 459 U.S. 961 (1982).
2 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169-70 (fair apportionment is a requirement under both
the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause); Moorman Mfg., 437 U.S. at 273-275
(Iowa's single factor formula is presumptively valid and since plaintiff failed to show that the
formula led to an arbitrary result, the assessed tax could not be challenged on Due Process
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evidence."'For a state to be able to apportion income of a corporation, then, the first
requirement is that the corporation be part of a unitary entity or, if inclusion
of certain income is disputed, this income must have its source in a corpora-
tion which is also a part of the unitary entity. As the U.S. Supreme Court
has frequently noted, "the linchpin of apportionability ... is the unitary
business principle."' Identifying a unitary business is a facts and circum-
stances determination governed by several defining characteristics. Initially,
some part of the unitary enterprise must be conducted in the taxing state,"
although the apportioned income may be derived from activities or events
occurring outside the state.2s Next, a unitary entity must be an integrated
operation whose in-state activities are related to its out-of-state activities.
29
grounds) (quoting Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. N.C. ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931)).
25 Moorman Mfg., 437 U.S. at 274 (since plaintiff failed to show by clear and cogent
evidence that the formula led to an arbitrary result, the assessed tax could not be challenged
on Due Process grounds) (quoting Hans Rees', 283 U.S. at 135)); Butler Brothers v.
McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 507 (1942) (California's three-factor formula apportioning income
did not violate a wholesale merchandiser's rights to Due Process since no showing of the
apportionment's lack of fairness was made); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury,
498 U.S. 358, 111 S. Ct. 818 (1991) (Michigan's value-added tax, calculated by a three-factor
formula, violated neither the Due Process Clause nor the Commerce Clause, since plaintiff
manufacturer made no showing of the apportionment's inherent unfairness).
2 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980); ASARCO,
458 U.S. at 317; F. W. Woolworth, 458 U.S. at 362 (each quoting this principle).
2 This implicitly requires that the corporation avail itself of the substantial privilege of
doing business within the state. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 166 (citing Exxon Corp. v.
Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 220 (1980) (noting that plaintiffs did not
challenge the fact that they availed themselves of the privilege of doing business in Wisconsin
by locating their marketing operations there)).
n Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 437 (Vermont's net income tax based on a three-factor formula
did not violate the Due Process Clause or the Commerce Clause as applied to a domestic
corporation's dividend income from foreign subsidiaries) (quoting Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney
Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940)). The Court noted that "[t]he fact that a tax is contingent
upon events brought to pass without a state does not destroy the nexus between such a tax
and transactions within a state for which the tax is an exaction."
2 The Container court noted that "the functional meaning of this requirement is that there
be some sharing or exchange of value not capable of precise identification or measure-
ment-beyond the mere flow of funds arising out of passive investment or distinct business
operation-which renders formula apportionment a reasonable method of taxation."
Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 166 (quoting ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 317); see also Butler
Brothers, 315 U.S. at 508; Exxon Corp., 447 U.S. at 224 (quoting Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 439,
441-42) (both noting the same requirement).
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A corporation's use of income received from another related corporation, or
a corporation's derivation of economic benefit from another business,
however, is singularly insufficient to establish the existence of a unitary
enterprise, and thus the necessary minimal connection between the corpora-
tion's activities and the taxing state?0 Finally, there must be unity of
ownership, management, and control.3' In this respect, courts will attach
importance to economic reality and not the reality asserted by the plain-
tiff.32 However, the mere potential to run a group of businesses as a
unitary entity and the "occasional oversight"-any parent gives to a subsidiary
does not constitute the operation of a unitary entity.33
The second Due Process requirement, that apportioned income be
rationally related to values connected with the taxing state, will be satisfied
if the apportionment is fair, or if it does not generate grossly distorted
results.'4 For an apportionment to be fair, first, it must be internally
consistent, which requires that the state not tax extraterritorial values.35
Prohibiting a state from taxing extraterritorial values requires that if all states
employed the same method of formula apportionment, all income of the
3o ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 327-28. Specifically, the Court held that "corporate purpose"
in receiving monies to enrich the corporation cannot be held sufficient to establish the
existence of a unitary enterprise and therefore taxing income received from subsidiaries which
are not a part of the unitary enterprise violated Due Process. See also F. W. Woolworth, 458
U.S. at 363-64 (finding an overall diversity of corporate enterprise, and thus the derivation
of economic benefit was an insufficient basis for New Mexico to tax income).
31 See Butler Brothers, 315 U.S. at 508 (the "unitary business principle" can also apply
to a series of similar enterprises operating in different jurisdictions but linked by common
managerial or operational resources producing economies of scale or transfer of resources);
F. W. Woolworth, 458 U.S. at 363-64 (unity of ownership but not of control is an insufficient
basis on which to tax the dividend income from foreign subsidiaries); Container Corp., 463
U.S. at 166 (citing this principle and quoting ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 316-17).
32 Exxon Corp., 447 U.S. at 223-24 (rejecting plaintiff's showing of a lack of unity
through its in-house accounting techniques and holding that plaintiff's marketing division was
part of a unitary entity, and therefore that its income was includible in Wisconsin's three-
factor formula to apportion state income in adherence with the Due Process Clause and the
Commerce Clause) (quoting Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 439, 441-42).
'3 F. W. Woolworth, 458 U.S. at 362, 369 (because plaintiff's four foreign subsidiaries
were not operated as a part of the unitary enterprise although they could have been, taxation
of this dividend income violated Due Process).
" See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Fair apportionment is also a requirement
under the Commerce Clause. See Container Corp. 463 U.S. at 169-70.
35 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169.
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corporate entity would be taxed.' The plaintiff, however, must show by
"clear and cogent evidence" that the formula, as applied to its corporation,
taxes extraterritorial income.37 Further, the plaintiff cannot rely on in-house
accounting techniques such as separate geographical accounting to demon-
strate this fact.3
Additionally, for an apportionment to be fair, it must be externally
consistent, which requires that the apportionment factors be reasonable.39
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that apportionment factors employed by
a state are presumptively valid unless a plaintiff makes a showing by "clear
and cogent evidence" that it produced an arbitrary result.' Additionally,
property, payroll, and sales, the three most common factors, have all been
approved by the Court as proper factors for formula apportionment.41
B. Commerce Clause Analysis
In addition to challenges raised under the Due Process Clause, constitu-
tional challenges to state tax accounting methods are also usually raised
m Id.; see also Underwood Typewriter, 254 U.S. at 121 (apportioned tax was not arbitrary
nor did it produce an unreasonable result, and therefore did not tax income earned outside its
borders). Underwood was the first case in which the Court noted the difficulty in specific
profit allocation and therefore required only that the formula produce reasonable results.
3" Butler Brothers, 315 U.S. at 506 (rejecting plaintiff's claim of extraterritorial taxation
and holding that the taxing method must only be "fairly calculated" to distribute a fraction
of total income to the state, a figure "reasonably attributable" to the business conducted within
the state); Moorman Mfg., 437 U.S. at 274-75 (noting that the corporation failed to show that
the taxed income was not in reasonable proportion to the business conducted within the state)
(quoting Hans Rees', 283 U.S. at 135).
' Butler Brothers, 315 U.S. at 507-08; Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 438; Exron Corp.,
447 U.S. at 221 (holding that Moorman does not sanction the use of separate accounting tech-
niques to prove that a state is taxing out-of-state income).
3 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169 (noting that "the apportionment formula must actually
reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated").
40 Moorman Mfg., 437 U.S. at 274 ("States have wide latitude in selection of apportion-
ment formulas and.., a formula-produced assessment will only be disturbed when taxpayer
has proved by 'clear and cogent evidence' that income attributed to state is in fact 'out of all
appropriate proportion to business transacted in that state' or has 'led to a grossly distorted
result.'. .. ").
41 Butler Brothers, 315 U.S. at 509 (property, payroll, and sales are proper factors in
apportionment formulas since they reflect the contributions of activities in different states to
net income).
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under the Commerce Clause.42 Commerce Clause analysis first requires
judicial examination of congressional action to determine if Congress
intended to preempt state taxation in the area, or intended to occupy the field
of the disputed taxation.43 If such a determination is made, then the federal
action preempts the state taxation, which will be declared invalid.' If
Congress has not acted to preempt the state taxation at issue, or if Congress
has remained silent on the issue, then Commerce Clause analysis moves to
a second level, dormant Commerce Clause analysis.4' A judicial determina-
tion must be made whether the state tax impermissibly interferes with either
interstate or foreign commerce.' When a state seeks to tax income earned
solely through activities conducted within the United States, the tax must
comport with Interstate Commerce Clause requirements formulated by the
U.S. Supreme Court.4' However, when a state seeks to tax instrumentalities
of, or income earned in, foreign commerce, the tax must also comport with
two additional requirements developed by the Court."
1. Acquiescence Preemption
Generally, if Congress has spoken on an issue through legislation or
regulations, then it will be deemed to have preempted state action. However,
in the area of state taxation, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that Congress,
by refusing to pass legislation or approve treaties which prohibit states from
employing certain taxing schemes, does not preempt the state taxation at
issue but essentially accepts state authority to tax as they choose, thereby
making a dormant Commerce Clause analysis improper.49 In other words,
the Court interprets congressional silence as an affirmative approval of state
42 The Commerce Clause grants to Congress the power "to regulate Commerce with
foreign nations [the Foreign Commerce Clause], and among the several States [the Interstate
Commerce Clause], and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
43 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrmONAL LAW §§ 6-25-27 (2d ed. 1987).
4Id.
sId. § 6-5.
4 Id. § 6-15.
4' See discussion infra part H.B.2.
48 See discussion infra part II.B.3.
" Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (Canadian
airline's Commerce Clause challenge to Florida's aviation fuel tax could not stand when
Congress had impliedly accepted state authority to tax the sale of fuel in bilateral agreements
with foreign countries).
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taxation schemes. The Court has warned, however, that only "law" and not
"aspirations" can operate as implicit approval of state action." Thus, by
refusing to regulate a particular class of state taxation, Congress leaves states
free to tax as they please, thus precluding a Commerce Clause analysis.
2. The Interstate Commerce Clause
When Congress has remained silent on the regulation of a particular area
of state taxation, a judicial determination becomes necessary on the
permissibility of a state taxation scheme under the confines of the Commerce
Clause. Any state tax accounting method on which Congress has not
legislated implicitly or explicitly must first comply with the requirements of
the Interstate Commerce Clause. Pursuant to the Interstate Commerce
Clause, a tax is appropriate if it (1) is applied to an activity with a substan-
tial nexus with the taxing state; (2) is fairly apportioned; (3) does not
discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) is fairly related to the
services provided by the state.5 The first two requirements are identical
to the two Due Process requirements. Thus, the first requirement that the tax
be applied to an activity which has a substantial nexus with the taxing state
prescribes that the corporation avail itself of the privilege of conducting
business with the state,52 and that it be a part of a unitary enterprise.53
The second requirement that the tax be apportioned fairly prescribes that the
tax be both internally and externally consistent.m
The third requirement, that a tax not discriminate against interstate
commerce obliges that the tax treat in-state and out-of-state businesses
'0 Id. at 10.
" Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, Chairman, Miss. Tax Comm'n, 430 U.S. 274,
279 (1977) (Mississippi sales tax on the privilege of doing business in the state did not violate
the Commerce Clause where a motor carrier delivering cars to Mississippi dealers failed to
prove the tax was applied to an'activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, was
not fairly apportioned, discriminated against interstate commerce, or that it was not fairly
related to the services provided by the state), reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 979 (1977).
52 See supra note 27.
"3 See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unitary enterprise
analysis under the Due Process Clause, which is virtually identical to that conducted under
the Commerce Clause.
-" See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text. For an apportionment to be fair, it must
be both internally consistent (the state cannot tax income earned outside of the state) and
externally consistent (the apportionment factors must be reasonable).
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equally." This requirement has been expanded to include a prohibition
against discrimination between domestic and foreign corporaiions.-' A tax
will be deemed to discriminate among domestic and foreign corporations if
it provides a direct commercial advantage to domestic corporations or if it
subjects foreign corporations to multiple taxation." A state can, however,
tax the privilege of doing business in a state, even if measured by profits
earned in interstate commerce, and still comply with the requirements of the
Commerce Clause.58 Additionally, the nondiscrimination requirement of the
Commerce Clause does not prohibit overlap in state taxation of income 59
nor does it prefer or require one method of tax accounting over another.6°
The last requirement that the tax be fairly related to the services provided by
the state is rarely challenged.
3. The Foreign Commerce Clause
Beyond the requirements of the Interstate Commerce Clause, when a state
taxes income earned in, or instrumentalities of, foreign commerce, two
further constraints are imposed: (1) the tax must not create a substantial risk
of international multiple taxation; and (2) the tax must not impede the federal
government in speaking with uniformity in the area of foreign commercial
relations.61
s Trinova Corp., I I 1 S Ct. at 835.
s Kraft Foods v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 120 L. Ed. 2d 59, 68 (1992) (holding that a
state cannot prefer domestic commerce over foreign commerce even if the discriminating
state's economy does not directly benefit from the discrimination).
57 Id.
m Underwood, 254 U.S. at 119-20 (upholding Connecticut's single-factor state income
apportionment formula against a challenge from plaintiffs who marketed products in
Connecticut, since payment of the tax was not a condition precedent to participation in
interstate commerce).
59 Moorman Mfg., 439 U.S. at 278 (the Commerce Clause does not require the use by all
states of a three-factor tax accounting formula since it does not prohibit overlap in state
taxation and since prescribing uniform rules would constitute judicial lawmaking).
60 Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 438 (separate geographic accounting is not constitutionally
required especially since it does not account for integrated businesses).
61 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446-48 (1979) (holding that
California's ad valorem tax violated both requirements imposed under the Foreign Commerce
Clause as applied to a Japanese shipping company's cargo containers used only in foreign
commerce).
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To preclude state taxation, a threat of international multiple taxation must
be demonstrated by more than the fact that foreign-source income is subject
to taxation in a foreign nation or in its situs state.62 A showing of actual,
in fact taxation is necessary.63 This threat does not mandate that states tax
in an identical manner to the federal government to avoid possible multiple
taxation," since no one tax accounting method is preferred over another,'
and the U.S. Supreme Court can correct any discrimination in foreign
commerce just as easily as in interstate commerce.' Because double
taxation is possible under either the apportionment or the separate geograph-
ical method of tax accounting, double taxation is also an insufficient chal-
lenge under the multiple taxation prohibition imposed by the Foreign
Commerce Clause.67 Thus, a state tax must truly create a substantial or
actual risk of international multiple taxation to be invalid.
. The second requirement, that a tax not prevent the federal government
from speaking with "one voice" in regulating commercial relations with
foreign countries, will be violated in either of two instances: (1) when the
tax implicates foreign policy issues which should be handled by the federal
government; or (2) when the tax violates a clear federal directive." In
determining whether a tax implicates foreign policy issues, significant
considerations are whether it may create an automatic asymmetry in the
world taxing market, whether it is imposed on a foreign entity or a domestic
corporation, and whether the taxed corporation may be subject to state tax
' Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 440-41.
63Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 452 (holding that California's ad valorem tax resulted in
multiple taxation of plaintiffs containers since the tax created more than a risk of multiple
taxation because the containers were actually taxed in Japan).
6 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 191-93 (the Foreign Commerce Clause does not require
California to adopt an "arm's-length" analysis used by the federal government and foreign
nations); Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 448 ("absent some explicit directive from Congress,
we cannot infer that treatment of foreign income at the federal level mandates identical
treatment by the states").
65 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
6Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 447 (application of Vermont's apportionment formula did not
subject petroleum company's foreign dividend income to a substantial risk of multiple taxa-
tion).
67 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 191-93 (concluding that since double taxation is possible
under either method, it would be "perverse" to require California to give up one method of
accounting for the other).
" Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194.
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regardless of the contested tax.' Finally, a tax will violate a clear federal
directive if the directive is one given by Congress." The more commonly
litigated requirement under Foreign Commerce Clause analysis is that a tax
not prevent the federal government from speaking with uniformity in regu-
lating commercial relations.
This brief synopsis of the legal framework surrounding Constitutional
challenges to state taxation schemes is to be used as a tool for thorough
understanding and analysis of the most recent decisions handed down in this
area. This body of law is still evolving as more complex parent-subsidiary-
branch relationships develop in the world market and as state taxing schemes
also become more complex.
III. ANALYSIS
Barclays Bank, as decided by both the California Supreme Court7' and
the Court of Appeal of California,72 was a landmark decision for states'
abilities to tax extraterritorial values of foreign-parent corporations. For
California alone, the two decisions will save the state an estimated three-and-
a-half billion dollars in future revenues 3 from multinational corporations
operating within the state, 4 at a time when California's state debt is
approximately ten billion dollars.75
In Barclays, the California Franchise Tax Board argued to the Court of
Appeal of California, Third District, that California's worldwide combined
reporting method of income apportionment violated neither the Foreign
Commerce Clause nor the Due Process Clause of the United States
Id. at 194-95 (California's tax is likely to lead to retaliation as it creates asymmetries
in the taxing market).
" This consideration is "essentially a species of pre-emption analysis." Id. at 194, 1%.
71 Barclays III, 829 P.2d. 279 (Cal. 1992).
7 Barclays 1, 10 Cal. App. 4th 1742, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), modified,
reh'g denied, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1678A (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
73 Part of this future revenue figure is based on refund claims pending against the
Franchise Tax Board, but which the Board deferred pending decision of Barclays Bank. See
Re: Deferral of Action on Refund Claims Pending Decision of Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., FTB Notice 89-714 (Nov. 7, 1989).
7' Barclays, Colgate-Palmolive Cases Seen One Step Closer to Supreme Court, 59
Banking Report (BNA) No. 21,797 (Dec. 7, 1992).
75 California Court Upholds Method For Combined Tax Assessment Reports, Banking
Daily (BNA) (May 19, 1992).
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Constitution. 6 Endorsing the view of the Franchise Tax Board, the
California Supreme Court agreed that there was no Foreign Commerce
Clause violation and remanded the case to the appeals court for decision of
the Due Process issue and the Interstate Commerce Clause issue." On
remand, the Court of Appeal of California, Third District held that the taxing
scheme as applied to the plaintiffs did not violate their Due Process rights
nor did it violate the nondiscrimination requirement of the Interstate
Commerce Clause. s
A. The Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause Issue
The California Supreme Court first noted that it was presented with the
issue left open after the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Container Corp. v.
Franchise Tax Board:9 the constitutionality of formula apportionment as
applied to a foreign-parent corporation." Having reviewed the competing
methods of state taxation,"' the court concluded that after seventy years of
U.S. Supreme Court state taxation cases, "the rule... has emerged.., that,
for state tax purposes, neither the Commerce Clause nor the Due Process
Clause of the federal Constitution mandates the use of a particular methodol-
ogy to allocate or distribute multijurisdictional income." 2 This conclusion
required the court to reject Barclays's argument that California's taxing
scheme as applied to unitary groups with foreign parents was inherently
unconstitutional.8 3
76 See Barclays II, 3 Cal. App. 4th at 1043.
7 See Barclays III, 829 P.2d at 300.7 Barclays 1, 10 Cal. App. 4th 1742, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), modified,
reh'g denied, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1678A (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
"9 Container Corp., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
'0 Barclays III, 829 P.2d at 281. The Court expressed its dismay with the appellate
court's treatment of this significant case by noting, "[despite the outcome in Container, the
Bank successfully contended before the Court of Appeal that issues implicated by its foreign
parentage are dispositive of the constitutional question and compel the opposite result in this
case." Id.
8' Id. The Court noted that neither separate accounting nor formula apportionment was
clearly preferable to the other and that "[bloth methods meet the constitutional standard of
avoiding 'unreasonably' attributing extrastate value to the taxing jurisdiction." Id.
92Id. at 285.
'3 Id. at 286.
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On the issue of whether the method of taxation, as applied to the
plaintiffs, violated the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, the court focused
its analysis on Wardair Canada v. Florida Dep't of Revenue." The
appellate court had held Wardair inapplicable, and a dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause analysis necessary, because a clear federal directive given
by the executive branch had been violated."5 The California Supreme Court
disagreed, however, and impliedly rejected the proposition that the executive
branch could indirectly nullify state tax schemes through expressions of their
policy." The court held that a dormant Foreign Commerce Clause analysis
was unnecessary since Congress had, by negative implication, acted by not
acting amidst executive pressure to regulate the state taxation system."7
The court based its finding primarily upon, first, the Senate's unwillingness
to ratify a treaty prohibiting the use of formula apportionment taxation by the
states until that provision was removed;" and second, several tax treaties
prohibiting the use of formula apportionment by the U.S. government but not
by the states. 89 Thus the court held that the clear federal directive, one of
two tests established in Container to gauge Foreign Commerce Clause
implications, could only be given by Congress, not by the executive branch
acting on behalf of foreign friends.'
Since the appellate court had failed to address the dormant Interstate
Commerce Clause and Due Process challenges, the California Supreme Court
remanded the case for a determination of those issues.91 The California
" Wardair, 477 U.S. at 1 (1986). The Wardair Court held that a dormant Foreign Com-
merce Clause analysis was unnecessary since Congress had spoken on the state's ability to
assess the tax at issue by refusing to legislate against it. See supra note 49 and accompanying
text. The Barclays court noted that the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Wardair
was "protocol for identifying those kinds of governmental silences that give rise to 'negative
implications' supporting an inference of federal acquiescence in the state tax under challenge."
Barclays ll, 829 P.2d at 292.
Barclays 111, 829 P.2d at 290-291.
Id. at 293.
I d. at 293. Noting the executive branch's sympathy with foreign governments' desires
to change the system, the court observed that "the chief forum for resulting executive branch
initiatives was the Senate, where successive administrations sought to win ratification of a
treaty provision barring state use of formula apportionment."
" l In 1978, the Senate rejected a tax treaty with the United Kingdom, explicitly noting
the "negative implications" of the treaty if it were to be passed.
89 1d.
9o Id. at 299.
9' Id. at 300.
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Supreme Court's opinion was solely concerned with the inapplicability of a
Foreign Commerce Clause analysis in the instant case.
B. The Interstate Commerce Clause Issue
Although Barclays challenged the California corporate tax scheme on
Foreign Commerce Clause grounds,' the California Supreme Court exam-
ined only those issues unique to Foreign Commerce Clause analysis, leaving
the inherent Interstate Commerce Clause issues included within Foreign
Commerce Clause analysis to the Court of Appeals. The trial court had held
that the administrative burden necessary for proper compliance was so great
that it violated the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause.93 On remand from
the California Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal of California, Third
District, reversed, holding that the Interstate Commerce Clause was not
violated.94
The trial court had found that the compliance burden inherent in
California's tax apportionment scheme for foreign corporations like
plaintiffs' was so substantial that it discriminated against interstate commerce
in violation of the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause test set out in
Complete Auto.95 Since a foreign corporation must always incur greater
compliance burdens under any tax system,96 on remand, the appeals court
held that plaintiffs' corporations did not suffer an unconstitutional discrimi-
9 The plaintiff's first cause of action was raised under the Foreign Commerce Clause, but
their second cause of action was raised under the Commerce Clause. See supra note 6 for
a detailed explanation of the causes of action. The courts, however, treated this cause of
action as raised under the Foreign Commerce Clause since both plaintiffs, Barclays Bank of
California and Barclays Bank International, have a foreign parent, engage in foreign
commerce, and are part of a foreign unitary entity. See Barclays II!, 829 P.2d 279.
" See supra note 6.
9' Barclays 1, 10 Cal. App. 4th at 1756.
" Pursuant to the Complete Auto test, for a state taxation scheme to comport with Inter-
state Commerce Clause requirements, it must (1) be applied to an activity with a substantial
nexus with the taxing state; (2) be fairly apportioned; (3) not discriminate against interstate
commerce; and (4) be fairly related to the services provided by the state. See supra text
accompanying notes 51-54 for a discussion of this test.
96 Barclays I, 10 Cal. App. 4th at 1753. The court stated that a violation could occur by
either the granting of a direct commercial advantage to domestic corporations or by subjecting
foreign corporations to multiple taxation (which was not at issue in this case).
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nation." The court also noted that the degree of administrative burden
which a corporation must bear is rarely a constitutionally determinative issue,
hinting that plaintiffs must carry a greater burden of proof in the future.9"
C. The Due Process Issue
Barclays had also challenged California's taxation scheme on Due Process
grounds in that literal compliance with the scheme was impossible and the
compliance burden was unconscionable." The trial court held that the
administrative burden inherent in plaintiffs' compliance with California's
taxing scheme indeed violated Due Process.'00 In construing the Due
Process Clause requirements, the Third District Court of Appeals noted that
the presence of either of two factors would make the plaintiffs' compliance
burden unconscionable: if compliance costs were unreasonable, undue, or
arbitrary, or if the compliance process was without reasonable and adequate
enforcement standards.'0 ' Based on its prior analysis under the nondis-
crimination requirement of the Interstate Commerce Clause, the court
concluded that compliance costs were not unreasonable, undue, or arbi-
trary.'O Similarly, since the court could give the regulations governing the
Code a reasonable and practical construction, California's taxing scheme
could not be held unconstitutional.' 03 The Franchise Tax Board's discre-
97 Id. The court concluded that "a foreign-based multijurisdictional enterprise, in
complying with a particular jurisdiction's taxation scheme, must always present its tax
information in the language, currency, and accounting principles the authorities in that
jurisdiction understand. This does not constitute a direct commercial advantage to unitary
groups based in that jurisdiction. At most, it constitutes an indirect cost inherent in doing
business in foreign lands."
"Id. at 1754 (the court did note that " 'cost taken into consideration with other factors
might be relevant in some cases to the issue of burden on commerce,' " (quoting Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 526 (1959)).
" See supra note 6 for a listing of plaintiffs' three causes of action.
100 Barclays 1, 10 Cal. App. 4th at 1757.
101 Id. at 1756.
'0o Id. Under the Interstate Commerce Clause, the court held that since a foreign
corporation will always incur greater compliance costs by the very nature of their foreign
character, there can be no discrimination against interstate commerce which would violate the
Interstate Commerce Clause. Id. See also supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
0'3 Barclays I at 1757. According to the court, "[a) statute, and hence a properly-adopted
regulation, will not be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction
can be given its language." Id. (citing Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.
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tion, the court concluded, was guided by reasonably adequate standards to
overcome a Due Process challenge."°
D. Barclays: A Logical Extension Or A Step Out Of Bounds?
Since the Constitution clearly grants to Congress, not to the executive
branch, the power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations,"'05 the
California Supreme Court was correct in rejecting the Third District Court
of Appeals' analysis of the Commerce Clause issue. Divining congressional
intent in the absence of congressional action is attenuating analysis, but
finding congressional action through a refusal on the part of Congress to act,
strains judicial analysis to the breaking point. Nevertheless, the United
States Supreme Court decision in Wardair"'° sanctions the implication of
congressional action when Congress has clearly failed to legislate on an
issue. The crucial question in Barclays, therefore, is whether Congress had
actually refused to regulate states' rights to tax intrastate values. This
question and the one raised in Wardair are particularly troubling: courts are
surmising congressional positions in the absence of congressional action. In
the state taxation field, congressional preemption is declared in cases where
Congress has failed to regulate or legislate upon an issue. The fact that a
bill has never been introduced and died in Congress speaks strongly of itself.
Furthermore, the unitary business taxing system appears to be firmly
entrenched and constitutionally insurmountable as the United States Supreme
Court increasingly refuses to legislate for Congress in this area. Resolution
of this case is consistent with the progression of cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court in this area from state taxation of multijurisdictional
corporations, to those with domestic parents, foreign parents, and foreign
corporations. Barclays only reinforces the validity of this taxing scheme
while further expanding the reach of the state taxing arm.
E. The Next Step: Congress
Counsel for Barclays Bank commented that final disposition of their case
by the California courts merely cleared the way for a petition of certiorari to
App. 3d 376, 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)).
'0' Id. at 1760.
'0 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
'06 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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be filed with the U.S. Supreme Court, a petition which was earlier denied
pending resolution of the Due Process issue with the Court of Appeal of
California." This will be the process followed by every case in the future
which challenges the validity and constitutionality of formula apportionment.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court. often must decide important issues
overlooked by Congress, the litigation over the validity of this tax accounting
method has continued for over seventy years. With the world markets
opening and the growth of multinational corporations increasing rapidly,
Congress must debate and decide the issue to avoid endless future litigation.
Additionally, the advent of trading zones may require that the United States
consolidate its tax policy to remain competitive in the world market.
The litigation in this country is not the only problem, however. The
international community is frustrated and angry with the United States over
states' use of the formula apportionment method of taxation. The anger of
the international community may soon lead to retaliatory measures, such as
imposing greater tax burdens on U.S. corporations operating within their
countries. Whether Congress decides to allow the use of formula apportion-
ment or prescribe the use of a uniform method of taxation, whatever it may
be, a framework for intrastate and international taxation by the states needs
to be established. Congress is the only body that can accomplish such a
result.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of California held that California's worldwide
combined reporting method of state apportionment taxation, as applied to a
foreign-parent corporation, did not violate the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause. Since Congress had intentionally not acted to preempt states' rights
in this area, the court held that a dormant Foreign Commerce Clause analysis
was unnecessary. On remand, the Court of Appeal of California, Third
District, held that California's taxation method violated neither the Due
Process Clause nor the Interstate Commerce Clause since the compliance
burden of a foreign-parent corporation is inherent in doing business overseas
and since the Franchise Tax Board had reasonably adequate standards
governing its decision-making in the taxing process.
Although this decision seems to be just the next in a line of U.S. Supreme
107 Barclays, Colgate-Palmolive Cases Seen One Step Closer to Supreme Court, 59
Banking Report (BNA) No. 21, 797 (Dec. 7, 1992).
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Court state taxing method decisions, increasing reliance is being placed upon
the fact that Congress has not acted in this area to regulate states' right of
taxation. This is a tenuous test for Commerce Clause analysis. Congress
must legislate on this issue, whether restricting states' rights to tax as they
please, or allowing the use of either formula apportionment or separate ac-
counting in income allocation to avoid further litigation and address the
anger of the international community over the system as it is today.
Sarah B. Pierce
